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"WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS" INJURY
EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE OF DEBT-
NINTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS A SUBJECTIVE
TEST FOR WHAT CONSTITUTES "WILLFUL
AND MALICIOUS" CONDUCT-IN RE SU
Katharine Battaia Richter*
ISTORICALLY, American bankruptcy law has frowned on re-
lieving debtor obligations resulting from "willful and malicious"
conduct.' The Supreme Court's opinion in Kawaauhau v. Geiger
purported to give some guidance on how to classify debt arising from a
"willful and malicious" action. 2 However, there has since been a split
among the circuits. 3 The Ninth Circuit added to the split in its recent
decision in In re Su4 when it adopted a narrow, subjective test to deter-
mine what conduct is willful and malicious and, therefore, non-discharge-
able. The Ninth Circuit's opinion was not a significant addition to the
subjective side of the debate because it was based on an incomplete read-
ing of relevant tort law, an incorrect interpretation of Congressional in-
tent, and an avoidance of important policy concerns. A better-reasoned
approach includes an objective component.
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.A., 2001, Austin College. The author wishes to thank her husband, Jeff Richter, for his
support.
1. See Michael D. DeFrank, An Ineffective Escape Hatch: The Textualist Mistake in
Geiger, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 467, 475-76 (2000). The 1898 Bankruptcy Act sought to give
debtors relief and creditors a way to act in recognition of the theory that society benefits
when debtor responsibilities are relieved. Id. at 475. The "willful and malicious" exception
to discharge was adopted in the 1898 Act because discharging debt from tort claims did not
further the social benefit theory. Id.
2. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1998). In a unanimous decision, the
Geiger Court commented that "willful and malicious" conduct calls to mind "intentional
torts" as opposed to negligent or reckless torts. See id. at 61.
3. See Gary Young, Who's for Forgiving Tort Judgments?, NAT'L L.J., July 10, 2002, at
B5 col.3. The Fifth Circuit has adopted a test for "willful and malicious" conduct that has a
subjective and an objective component, while the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have adopted
strictly subjective tests. Id. It is important to note that besides the subjective versus the
subjective/objective test division in the circuits, there is another point of conflict among the
circuits on the issue of what conduct is "malicious." See Howard B. Kleinberg, When Does
the "Willful and Malicious Injury" Exception to Discharge Apply to a Debt Stemming from
a Conversion of Collateral?, 119 BANKING L.J. 87, 89 (2002) (noting that courts vary as to
whether "willful and malicious" is one standard or two).
4. In re Su, 290 F.3d 1140, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).
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On her way to work on August 21, 1997, Dora Carrillo was seriously
injured when she crossed a major intersection in downtown San Fran-
cisco. 5 That morning, Louis Su ran a red light while driving a 14-passen-
ger van at a speed of thirty-seven miles per hour in a 25-mile-an-hour
zone.6 He smashed his van into a car and then struck Carrillo, causing
her serious and permanent injury. 7
Carrillo sued Su in state court alleging Su's actions were "wanton, will-
ful and malicious," and that his intentional conduct resulted in permanent
injury to Carrillo.8 The jury found that Su's negligence resulted in Car-
rillo's injuries and found Su "guilty of malice."9 The jury awarded Car-
rillo economic and non-economic damages, but no punitive damages.10
Su filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition with the bankruptcy court af-
ter the state court entered the judgment against him." Carrillo argued at
the adversary proceeding' 2 that her judgment against Su was not dis-
chargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)13 based on the Fifth Circuit's de-
cision in In re Miller.'4 The bankruptcy court agreed with Carrillo's
reasoning and found that Su's debt to Carrillo was nondischargeable be-
cause, by an objective standard, there was a substantial certainty of harm
when Su ran the red light at an intersection known for its congestion. 15
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) reversed the bankruptcy
court's finding. 16 The BAP held that the bankruptcy court's application of
an objective test to the facts of the case was inconsistent with the jurispru-
dence of the Ninth Circuit.' 7
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the findings of the bankruptcy court de
novo and independently reviewed the bankruptcy court's ruling on ap-
peal from the BAP.' 8 Thus, the issue before the Ninth Circuit was what
type of standard-an objective or a subjective one-must be applied to
5. Id. at 1t41.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 1141.
9. Id. The state court defined "malice" as conduct that is intended to cause injury to
the plaintiff or that is despicable and carried on with a "willful and conscious disregard for
safety and rights of others." Id.
10. Id. at 1141-42.
1. Id. at 1142.
12. Id.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2002) ("A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a),
1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ...
for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of an-
other entity.").
14. In re Miller, 156 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 1998). The Fifth Circuit held that "an injury is
'willful and malicious' where there is either an objective substantial certainty of harm or a
subjective motive to cause harm." Id. at 606.
15. In re Su, 290 F.3d at 1142.
16. Id.
17. Id. The BAP based its holding on the ruling in In re Jercich, 238 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
2001), another Ninth Circuit case that came down while Su was pending before the BAP.
Id. In Jercich, the Ninth Circuit adopted a subjective test, which the court purported was in
line with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Miller. See In re Jercich, 238 F.2d at 1208.
18. In re Si, 290 F.3d at 1142.
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establish a debtor's conduct toward a creditor as willful and malicious
and, therefore, nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code. 19
The Ninth Circuit rejected an objective test in favor of a subjective test
under which a debt is nondischargeable when the debtor either subjec-
tively intends to cause injury or subjectively believes harm is substantially
certain to occur from his actions.20 The Geiger Court's opinion pointed
the Ninth Circuit to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the formula-
tion of its subjective standard.2' After examining the Geiger Court's opin-
ion and the Restatement, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that adding an
objective component, as the Fifth Circuit had done,22 would go beyond
the intent of Congress.23 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the BAP that the
bankruptcy court-in focusing solely on the "objective substantial cer-
tainty of harm" stemming from Su's driving-applied the wrong legal
standard.24 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the bankruptcy court
for application of the purely subjective test.25
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning behind the adoption of a subjective test
for § 523(a)(6)'s "willful injury" component described above is flawed in
its interpretation of applicable legal theory and legislative history and is
devoid of a discussion of public policy issues. The remainder of this case-
note brings out these problems with the Ninth Circuit's opinion and lays
out a better approach to assessing dischargeability of debt. First, the
Ninth Circuit ignored the comments to the Restatement provision it fol-
lowed so closely in adopting a subjective test. Second, a test that includes
an objective component would better satisfy the ideas found in a more
complete review of the history of the willful and malicious injury excep-
tion. Finally, public policy calls for an objective component since a
strictly subjective test presents proof problems for creditors.
The Ninth Circuit should have adopted an objective component in rec-
ognition of relative tort law principles that the Geiger Court embraced in
its holding. In Geiger, the Supreme Court textually defined § 523(a)(6) to
19. See id.
20. See id. at 1142-46. The Ninth Circuit simultaneously rejected the adoption of an
objective test. Id.
21. See id. at 1143-44. The Ninth Circuit recognized that while the Geiger Court men-
tions that § 523(a)(6) brings intentional torts to the lawyer's mind, the Geiger Court "did
not expressly adopt [the] subjective Restatement formulation" of the test for an intentional
tort as the test for "willful and malicious injury." Id. The Restatement (Second) defines an
action as intentional if the actor subjectively "desires to cause consequences of his act ...
or believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from [his act]." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
22. In In re Miller, the Fifth Circuit held that "either objective substantial certainty or
subjective motive meets the Supreme Court's definition of 'willful . . . injury' in
§ 523(a)(6)." In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 603.
23. In re Su, 290 F.3d at 1145-46. The Ninth Circuit commented that an objective com-
ponent based on a reasonable person standard is too similar to the "reckless disregard"
standard, a standard the Senate Committee report says is not strict enough to term conduct
"willful." See id. at 1145 nn.4-5.
24. See id. at 1145 n.4.
25. Id. at 1145.
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say that "willful," as used in the statute, modifies the word "injury. ' 26 The
Geiger Court held that "debts arising from recklessly or negligently in-
flicted injuries do not fall within the compass of § 523(a)(6). '27 The Gei-
ger Court distinguished between actions that are negligent or reckless and
those that are intentional when it noted that an intentional act is one in
which the actor "intend[s] 'the consequences of an act,' not simply 'the
act itself." 28 While the Geiger Court mentioned intentional torts as an
indicator of when a debtor has "willfully" injured someone, it did not
conclude that only the subjective component should be adopted in a test
for "willful" injury.29
It makes sense, then, that the Ninth Circuit should have looked to the
Restatement to determine what injuries are "willful," but it does not fol-
low that the Ninth Circuit should have done so incompletely. The Geiger
Court affirmed an Eighth Circuit opinion in which "intent" was defined
in terms of the two-pronged Restatement definition that includes an ob-
jective component. 3° Comment b of the Restatement describes an objec-
tive approach to evaluating intent that "is not ... limited to consequences
which are desired. If the actor knows that the consequences are ... sub-
stantially certain to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated
by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result."'31 The Ninth
Circuit made no mention of the objective component to finding an actor's
intent that Comment b presents. Only by leaving a discussion of Com-
ment b out of its opinion did the Ninth Circuit make a logical argument
to adopt a solely subjective test.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion is also flawed due to its incorrect interpre-
tation of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code32 and the advent
of the "willful and malicious" exception to discharge. A review of the
history of the Bankruptcy Code shows the over-arching policy goal of
bankruptcy is two-fold: (1) to give the debtor a "fresh start" that allows
him or her to regain his or her economic productivity, and (2) to allow
creditors to collect payment. 33 The "willful and malicious" exception
came into being because such conduct was not thought to be a part of
26. Geiger, 523 U.S. at 61.
27. Id. at 64.
28. Id. at 61-62 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 8A cmt. a).
29. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § I
cmt. a, para. 10 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001). While the Restatement notes that the Geiger
Court refers to intentional torts as a way to evaluate willful and malicious injury, it com-
ments that both a subjective and objective component can be interpreted from the same
opinion. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAn. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § I cmt. a,
para. 10 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
30. See Geiger, 523 U.S. at 64; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAnl. FOR
PHYSICAL HARM § I cmt. a, para. 10.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 8A (emphasis added). The objective portion
of comment b is in addition to the subjective component clearly noted within the main text
of the section. Id.; see also In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 604 (noting that an intentional tort
requires "either objective substantial certainty or subjective motive to do harm").
32. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2002).
33. See Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A His-
torical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 63-64 (1986).
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socially useful risk-taking. 34 One could also conclude that the rule as it
exists today35 has a moral component, given the "existence of widely held
standards regarding the ethical status of [willful and malicious] con-
duct."'36 The provision was carried over into modern bankruptcy law by
its adoption into the 1978 Bankruptcy Code (still in effect today) with the
comment that "'willful' means deliberate or intentional" and a "reckless
disregard" standard is not strict enough to test for willful conduct. 37
Thus, a test for willful and malicious conduct that includes an objective
prong is in accordance with the legislative history for two reasons. First,
the history prohibits a recklessness standard, not an objective compo-
nent.38 Second, adoption of an objective component helps ensure that
debts that stem from morally wrong conduct-rather than poor economic
conduct-do not get discharged, as the drafters originally intended.39
The Ninth Circuit also ignored policy arguments that favor adoption of
an objective prong when it adopted a solely subjective test for "willful
and malicious" injury.4°1 If a creditor can only subjectively test a debtor's
intent, then he has a virtually insurmountable burden of proof to show
that a debtor acted "willfully."' 4' Essentially, if there is no objective stan-
dard, a creditor can only hope the debtor is "honest" on the stand and
admits that he willfully caused the creditor injury.42 Such an admission is
hard to obtain. For instance, in Geiger, the creditor was a patient who lost
a limb as a result of her doctor's carelessness. 43 Though there was com-
pelling evidence that the doctor's actions were "deliberate" and "inten-
tional,' 44 the injury the doctor's actions caused was not classified as
"willfully" wrought since the doctor only admitted to giving "substandard
care."'45 Such reliance on the debtor's testimony puts the debtor in con-
trol of the case and leaves the creditor with only a narrow avenue to
pursue.
Though the Ninth Circuit claimed consideration of circumstantial evi-
dence to prove willful injury is "fundamentally subjective,' 46 the court
34. See id.
35. See DeFrank, supra note 1, at 475-76, 481 (noting that the language of the rule
today has not changed much since its adoption in 1898).
36. Hallinan, supra note 33, at 138.
37. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865.
38. But see Young, supra note 3. Young notes that the Ninth Circuit felt an objective
standard was too much like a recklessness standard, which the drafters had completely
rejected. Id.
39. See DeFrank, supra note 1, at 486-87. DeFrank argues that the Geiger Court inap-
propriately used a textualist argument to defend its position favoring a subjective test. Id.
40. See generally id.
41. See id. at 487. DeFrank finds it problematic that the Geiger Court did not discuss
how a creditor could prove willful injury where the creditor denies having acted willfully
even if the facts suggest otherwise. See id.
42. See id.
43. Geiger, 523 U.S. at 59.
44. Id.; see also De Frank, supra note 1, at 484-86.
45. DeFrank, supra note 1, at 487.
46. In re Su, 290 F.3d at 1146 n.6. The court commented that allowing a review of
circumstantial evidence remains "fundamentally subjective" since the focus is still on what
was going through the debtor's mind. Id.
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failed to support its argument. The purpose of an objective test is to ana-
lyze the situation from a reasonable person's viewpoint in order to infer
the mindset of the actor. Thus, looking at circumstantial evidence to infer
a debtor's mindset at the time of his injurious actions remains objective
no matter what brush the artist uses to paint the picture. A fact finder is
allowed and, in cases where circumstantial evidence makes up the bulk of
the argument, expected to make reasonable inferences based on an objec-
tive approach to the problem. The bankruptcy court judge in In re Su did
just that; he looked at the facts, made a reasonable inference that willful
and malicious injury had occurred, and declared the debt nondischarge-
able.47 Explaining away the need for an objective test by calling it "sub-
jective" is not only bad logic, but also not convincing. The public policy
concerns arising from allowing courts to take away avenues of proof by
building walls to keep out important lines of evidence and by redefining
well-settled concepts are avoided with the adoption of an integrated test.
While accepting the public policy need for an objective component in
the willful and malicious injury test does result in a lighter burden on
creditors, it does not overburden the courts that hear the cases. 48 In-
stead, it equips judges with a test-the reasonable person standard-they
can use to draw a discretionary line.
The Ninth Circuit should have adopted an objective component to test
for willful injury. The inclusion of an objective component is a better-
reasoned option since it complies with relevant tort law as referenced in
Geiger, the legislative history of bankruptcy law, and public policy.
47. See In re Si, 290 F.3d at 1142. The jury in the state court found Su guilty of "mal-
ice," meaning conduct intended to cause injury and carried on with a "willful and conscious
disregard for safety and rights of others." Id. at 1141.
48. But see id. at 1145.
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